Degressivity was left to the member states as an option, with a very small level made mandatory . Moreover, member states could choose to garnish their total national envelope, as opposed to applying degressivity directly to their largest earnings, allowing them to reduce or entirely eliminate the loss to large farmers. Finally, greening measures were watered down, the end result being that most farmers were exempted from compliance, and overall standards were lowered. Essentially, anything that was contentious or in some way resisted by a member state was handled one of three main ways: the standards for the policy were lowered; the qualifications for an exemption were widened; or discretion for what standards to set and how to enforce the policy was given to the individual member state. In the end, nearly 50% of arable land covered by the CAP and just under 90% of arable goods farmers were exempted from the new greening rules and standards. The remaining more minor elements of the initial reform proposal were also adjusted in the final agreement. Those member states whose direct income payments were 90% or more below the EU average were afforded more flexibility in transferring funds between Pillar 2 and Pillar 1 . The proposal to more rigorously define who counts as a farmer and thus what land can be considered agricultural was significantly weakened. The Commission’s effort to restrict a base payment to individuals engaged in farming as their primary source of income was also completely defeated, meaning anyone with agricultural land could receive this payment, even if they were a non-farmer.

A.2.3 which summarizes the changes for these small proposals can be found in the Appendix.The MFF agreement,square pot which fixed the budget and also included some CAP provisions shaped the course of the CAP negotiations that operated concurrently and ultimately subsequent to the battle over the budget. This effect was perhaps most profound in the area of greening. Greening measures to support the environment and battle climate change were, at least at one point, considered an essential part of justifying the increasingly criticized direct payment scheme. In the initial stages of the CAP reform, when the process began in 2010 before the MFF talks were underway, it was expected that farmers would be required to provide a direct, clear, “public good” in the form of following particular environmental practices in exchange for the receipt of direct payments. However, once the MFF was agreed, the greening push was fatally weakened. With the budget fixed, the threat of imposing cuts if greening standards were not raised was no longer credible. The greening case was hurt more broadly by the fact that there was general uncertainty of the extent to which these measures would deliver real, significant environmental benefits. In addition, many worried about the added financial costs for farmers and more broadly the bureaucratic cost of administering these programs. In the end, the final agreement fell well short of initial proposals. A perhaps overly pessimistic view was expressed by multiple DGVI officials who lamented that rather than making the CAP fairer, greener, and simpler, reform left the CAP still unfair, barely greener, and far more complex . This characterization understates the reform. In fact, there were meaningful changes to reduce systemic inequalities. That said, the reform did make the CAP far more complex and also did little to improve greening.

The discussion of the 2013 CAP Reform in this chapter elucidates two major components of my approach for understanding agricultural policy reforms. First, the case of the 2013 reforms, particularly when considered in comparison to the MacSharry and Fischler Reforms, illustrates how the almost complete absence of important events outside the CAP itself, such as trade negotiations or budgetary crisis, limits the scope of possible reforms, preventing path breaking change. The only real source of leverage for Cioloș was enlargement. Demonstrating the importance of disruptive politics, the only component of the 2013 reform that included meaningful change, the adjustment of the direct payment system, was the one that could be linked to this disruptive reform pressure. The 2013 CAP agreement serves as an example of what happens when negotiators are not able to push discussions to consider the broader context of the CAP but instead remained focused on the CAP alone. Consistent with the expectations of “politics as usual”, the outcome of the 2013 Reform was underwhelming, with little real change, extensive modifications that weakened the proposed initiatives, and numerous exemptions granted to the already watered down policies. Rather than creating and adopting new initiatives, the biggest contribution of the 2013 Reform was fixing the malfunctioning direct payment system, a reform only made possible by enlargement. Otherwise, in the absence of events that forced the CAP to contend with disruptive politics, there was no sense of urgency like there had been for the CAP reforms of MacSharry and Fischler . In each of those cases, the Commission had been able to press for a fundamental reworking of the core operations of the CAP. Without these disruptive pressures, the Commission was unable to push for bold reform.

To understand the final outcome of the 2013 reform of the CAP it is, like reforms past, useful to apply theories of welfare state retrenchment. Most prominently, reformers employed a vice into virtue style strategy in the realm of direct payments. The existing direct income payment program was functioning unfairly. Moreover, it was increasingly the target of criticism from EU officials, including those beyond DGVI, and some member state governments. Rather than scrap the entire direct payment program and attempt to create something completely new, a very difficult task, the final agreement amended the system of calculating direct payments. It eliminated those methods available only to the old member states, which were the source of the inequality, and introduced a calculation system that would be used by all member states. As is typical in reforms of social programs, the final package included a number of side payments, concessions, and exemptions in order to facilitate the agreement. For example, the rules for the Ecological Focus Area, what was supposed to be a major part of the greening component of the CAP agreement ultimately included so many exemptions that 88% of farmers were granted exemptions from it. In the end, nearly every proposal was significantly watered down, and some, like placing limits on direct payments, were defeated outright. Though the changes to the direct payment system and to environmental policy were weaker and narrower than hoped, these did still constitute a change to the operation of the CAP and as such created the opportunity for deeper systemic retrenchment in the future. Systemic retrenchment has succeeded in the past, as reformers have slowly built upon changes to environmental practices and to the system of income support to bring about deeper changes further down line. Overall, and particularly in comparison to the reform that preceded it,drainage collection pot the 2013 agreement was an unremarkable reform. Some adjustments were made to the direct payment system, but the rate of redistribution would be low and slow. Yet again, reformers failed to place a cap on direct payments, ensuring that, despite redistribution efforts, the gulf between the richest and poorest farmers, within and between countries would remain large. Environmental measures, which were supposed to be a central component of the reform were gutted. Even the goal that every single member state and institution supported, to make the CAP simpler , was not really achieved. While the process for calculating direct payments was certainly streamlined, already overly complex greening policies were made even more complicated. In fact, the post-reform consensus was that the 2013 reform resulted in a CAP that was more complex than ever before. In the end, the only notable policy resulting from this reform, the change to the direct payment system, is the only one that can be tied to disruptive politics, this time in the form of enlargement.The previous four chapters have explored the major rounds of CAP reform, illustrating my claims about the conditions that affect policy reform, the nature of farmer power, and the links between welfare state reform tactics and agricultural policy reform, including the key strategy of pairing compensation with reform. These chapters have demonstrated that reforming agricultural policy is an exercise in navigating farmer power. Theories of welfare state retrenchment help to explain how and why the process of agricultural policy unfolds in the manner that it does. Most often, reformers rely on the kinds of strategies described by Paul Pierson in his analysis of welfare retrenchment: compensating farmers, making smaller adjustments to correct existing policies , and introducing changes that may open the door to more far-reaching shifts down the road .

When CAP reform is initiated at a time of disruptive politics, like trade negotiations or enlargement, it is much more likely to succeed. The 1992 MacSharry and 2003 Fischler reforms occurred at times of disruptive politics and the end result was major reform to the operation of the CAP payment system. Of course, as my argument requires, these reforms 1) were paired with generous compensation and 2) largely consisted of recalibration, in which the modes of payment were changed, but the amounts remained the same. Under politics as usual, reform proposals are almost always defeated. The 1999 and 2013 CAP reforms occurred in “normal” times- no trade negotiations were occurring and enlargement was not looming. In both cases, despite proposals for extensive change, the CAP remained virtually unchanged. Any minor reforms that did occur were either accompanied by extensive compensation or qualified by massive exemptions. The previous four chapters have demonstrated how theories of welfare state retrenchment, combined with an awareness of the broader context of the reforms, can help explain the process and outcome of the CAP reform. The question remains, however, if the analytical efficacy of welfare state retrenchment theories stems from circumstances particular to the CAP and the EU or if this approach can be applied more broadly. In order to assess the analytic usefulness of my approach, I test it under a variety of different conditions and circumstances in three mini-cases: austerity-driven domestic policy in Europe, domestic agricultural policy reform in Japan, and agricultural trade policy negotiations in the GATT Uruguay Round.My claims about the politics of agricultural policy reform and farmers’ influence over policy making are not restricted to the CAP and the specific circumstances of EU politics. They can also explain agricultural reform at the domestic level. To make this case, I explore domestic politics and policy making in the wake of the 2008 financial crises. The mini case proceeds in two parts. I begin with a close look at France, focusing on domestic policy reforms, which are not specifically agricultural in nature. An “eco tax” 41, proposed in France in 2013, that was to affect truck transport of goods, including agricultural products, was abandoned due to pressure in large part from farmers. Pension-related cuts, however, went ahead despite mass protests. The second part of the mini case looks at domestic reform in Europe more broadly, and confirms that the French case is not an outlier. Indeed, I find that at the domestic level, European governments largely did not cut national discretionary spending on agriculture, while they did impose significant cuts on pensions. In the wake of the Great Recession and sovereign debt crisis, austerity programs were adopted across the European Union. Spending was cut, programs of support for those suffering financial hardship were canceled or suspended, and new taxes were created to help generate revenue for cash-strapped governments. One social group that would have appeared to be particularly vulnerable to austerity-imposed policies is the agricultural community. Any spending cuts or new tax burdens would therefore apply to only a small portion of the population, in theory allowing politicians and policymakers to minimize the negative backlash faced by aggrieved constituents. Moreover, farmers already receive a disproportionate share of financial support, given their share of the population, making their programs and policies low-hanging fruit for retrenchment-minded officials. Yet, since the 2008 financial crisis, farmers have felt little if any of the budgetary pressure that austerity has brought to bear on communities across Europe. As is observed in EU policy making, farmers at the domestic level successfully resist the imposition of new costs that are not paired with compensation.